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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



REORGANIZING GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND
HEADQUARTERS FOR JOINT FORCE 2020

by

Rhude Cherry III

Colonel, United States Air Force

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
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This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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
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ABSTRACT

As the United States' strategic defense priorities change, our Geographic Combatant Command Headquarters (GCCM HQ) must evolve to address these and other issues. The Geographic Combatant Command Headquarters' staff must holistically reorganize to meet strategic needs of the 21st Century Joint Force. This study provides an academic and historical review of organization theory and constructs that end in a recommendation for all six GCCM HQs. Three ways to meet these requirements are: 1) staff efficiencies realized through organizational construct that provide greater flexibility; 2) inclusion of relevant interagencies and multinational participation in GCCM efforts; and 3) establishment of standardized staff positions that provide seamless synchronization of global efforts. Two case studies provide insight into how organizational structures evolve due to leadership changes, environmental dynamics, and strategic shifts. Keys to the recommended structure are Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) span-of-control, structural hierarchy, external environment impacts on operations, the inclusion of interagencies and multi-national efforts within the staff, and the various national and Combatant Command (COCOM) strategic interests.

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INTRODUCTION

“The Sun...In dim eclipse, disastrous twilight sheds on half the nations, and with fear of change perplexes monarchs.”

-- John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, I, l. 594¹

The drawdowns from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a reduced Department of Defense budget, the evolving security environment, and the pivot of U.S. interest to the Pacific are reasons our military must restructure/reorganize. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the “Chairman”) indirectly stipulate such changes be made now to accommodate Joint Force 2020. All Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCMs) continue to align their theater strategies with recently released national guidance. In doing so, the Geographic Combatant Command headquarters (GCCM HQ) staffs must reorganize because “structure undeniably can and does influence strategy.”² Three ways to meet these requirements are: 1) staff efficiencies realized through organizational construct that provide greater flexibility; 2) inclusion of relevant interagencies and multinational participation in GCCM efforts; and 3) establishment of standardized staff positions that provide seamless synchronization of global efforts. Understanding that there will likely be organizational changes within the U.S. national agencies, the GCCM HQ must restructure while meeting the demands of the current conflicts.

One of the requirements laid out in the new defense strategic guidance, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, is to “[find] further

¹ John Bartlett, *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations*, ed. Justin Kaplan (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 264.

² Fred R. David, *Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases* (Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2005), 251.

efficiencies in overhead and headquarters.”³ Headquarters’ staffs at all echelons should strive for smaller numbers of personnel, process efficiencies, and hybrid structures that blend functional, divisional, networked, and matrix organizational constructs across key mission areas. The Chairman states a key effort for the military is to “examine organizational and other force development changes to better leverage game-changing capabilities.”⁴ In the same pamphlet, the Chairman states that one of his key efforts is to “expand the envelope of interagency and international cooperation [and] promote multilateral security approaches and architectures to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression.”⁵ The GCCM HQ is one place to address these architectural concerns. In keeping with the Chairman’s direction to “develop a Joint Force for 2020 (JF 2020) that remains ready to answer the Nation’s call—anytime, anywhere,”⁶ GCCM HQs must reorganize.

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations 2020 (CCJO) provides further areas of interest that impact GCCM headquarters’ organization. Three elements of the globally integrated operations concept will impact headquarters’ organizational structures: Global agility, partnering, and flexibility. Regarding global agility, the CCJO states a “more nimble command and control will also allow resources to be allocated, shifted, and de-conflicted more fluidly among combatant commanders as strategic priorities evolve.”⁷ Nimble command and control both influences and is influenced by staff organization. Partnering begins with organizing to accommodate and integrate “effectively with U.S.

³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC, January, 2012), 7.

⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force* (Washington, DC: February 6, 2012), 8.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington, DC: September 12, 2012), 5.

Governmental agencies, partner militaries, and indigenous and regional stakeholders.”⁸

Flexibility refers to the fusion of global and regional operations and challenges.

“Geography remains the logical basis for conducting theater cooperative security, while some missions, such as strategic deterrence, remain functionally distinct. Rather, the intent is to explore hybrid command arrangements that provide greater flexibility in how Joint Forces accomplish their mission.”⁹ The new GCCM HQ will have to account for global agility, partnering, and flexibility by reorganizing.

At the behest of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) J56 this study will provide recommendations as how to best organize a GCCM HQ to meet the needs of Joint Force 2020. The proposed hybrid constructs should impact all echelons of command from the Unified Commands down to increasingly lower echelons (e.g., Brigade/Wing level), but is focused at the GCCM HQ. “The imperative for lateral coordination will be a distinguishing feature of these new hybrid organizations.”¹⁰ The size and shape of the organization will be evaluated in the context of vertical and horizontal designs discussed in Chapter One. Most importantly, the integration of other U.S. Government (USG) agencies and partners is fundamental to the new HQ structure. Finally, understanding the linkage between mission, strategy, and structure is the key to organizing the GCCM HQ.

This study will take a holistic view of the six GCCMs in order to provide broad structural recommendations by discussing both standardized and special duty positions. Joint Publication 1 (JP-1) states “the staff organization should generally conform to the principles established in” Chapter V, Section 7 which details five specified staff divisions: Principle Staff Officer (Chief of Staff, COS); Personal Staff Group of the

⁸ Ibid., 6.

⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, 6.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Commander¹¹; Special Staff Group; Joint Force Staff Directorates (J-1 personnel; J-2 intelligence; J-3 operations; J-4 logistics; J-5 planning; and J-6 communications); and Liaison Officers and/or Agency Representatives.¹² Personnel assigned to liaison and representative positions are dependent on a number of variables which are beyond the scope of this paper; however, the documents that form the basis for such assignments are part of the discussion.¹³ The classified documents, Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum, and the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance provide the manpower billets allocated to each of the GCCMs; however, they are not discussed in this study.

Recommendations for organizational changes above the Combatant Command (CCMD) echelon are not discussed; however, several duty positions in the GCCM HQs are dependent on such change. In particular, the positioning of representatives from other USG agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) is evaluated because they are critical to the “whole-of-government” (WOG) approach. Assurance that such personnel are provided to the GCCM HQs cannot be guaranteed, but is essential to reorganizing for JF 2020. That said, the study illustrates a proposed future evolution of these positions.

The HQ staff processes govern the movement and use of information, and are necessary for proper functioning of the organization; however, they are not discussed in this paper. The organizational structure is kept independent of the staff processes in

¹¹ The Personal Staff Group is ill-defined and left to the Commander’s discretion. It normally includes the commander’s aides, director of staff, and special assistants. The Special Staff group is also left to the Commander’s discretion.

¹² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 7, 2007, Incorporating Change 1, March 20, 2009), V-13-17.

¹³ Assigned forces to the GCCMs are drawn from all services and some USG agencies. This paper will not delve into the assignment or allocation processes of personnel.

order to provide specificity to the size and shape of the headquarters staff. The processes used within an organization require a separate study be performed, but understanding the staff structure is an essential step in reorganizing.

The relationship the CCMDs have with their service components is important, but is not included in this paper. Coordination with the service component commands is integral to the CCMD's joint functions, but they are not part of the GCCM HQ staff organizational construct. The interdependent relationship between the CCMD HQ staff and the service component staffs is nested within the J-coded directorates via LNOs, and is executed through commander relationships and staff processes. This paper will focus on the CCMD HQ staff organization as it relates to supporting the CCDR and the CCMD strategy, but remain divorced from discussing the service component and subordinate command staffs and their LNOs.

The structure of this study begins with an introduction followed by three chapters and associated appendices. The introduction provides the background and justification for this thesis. Chapter One discusses various organizational theories, constructs, associated workings, and applicable vocabulary used throughout the remainder of the paper. Chapter Two provides two case studies as the foundation for the study's recommendations. The first case study, General Electric Company (GE), provides a model of a large, international firm. The second details the current International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), headquartered in Kabul, Afghanistan, to help shed light on the workings of a multinational command that also capitalizes on the "whole-of-government" (WOG) approach across multiple organizations. Chapter Three adds tools for change when reorganizing headquarters. Chapter Four presents the current GCCM missions,

strategy, and HQ staff structure and discusses the GCC's span-of-control, staff positions unique to the GCCM, and the levels of hierarchy. The analysis includes a discussion of the conclusions drawn from the case studies relative to the construct of a current GCCM HQ. From this insight, recommendations for reorganizing the GCCM HQs are provided with supporting logic and a conclusion ends the discussion.

These are not ordinary times; for it is much easier to cling to what is known and affect small changes than it is to create something strange and unproven! Hybrid organizations are complex and misunderstood. Restructuring the GCCM HQ staff is challenging and filled with doubts, but is necessary to meet today's challenges. Staff efficiencies will provide greater flexibility to the JF 2020. Inclusion of U.S. Government (USG) interagencies and limited multi-national participation in GCCM efforts is now the norm, but how best to integrate their capability is still evolving. The establishment of standardized staff positions to integrate and assimilate lateral coordination between Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) and their command staffs is necessary to meet global agility requirements. CCDRs are stepping out of their comfort zone because their responsibilities are not limited to the military, but include diplomatic, informational, and economic aspects. Likewise, CCMD staffs must support all of the areas the CCDR designates or desires to become involved. By reorganizing their HQ staff, the GCCs will ensure they have a flexible staff ready to provide the best, most efficient support to the command.

CHAPTER 1

Organization Theory

“Our ideas are only intellectual instruments which we use to break into phenomena; we must change them when they have served their purpose, as we change a blunt lancet that we have used long enough.”

-- Claude Bernard, Introduction a l'Etude de la Medecine Experimentale¹

This chapter discusses organizational constructs and relevant terms to establish a basic vocabulary for subsequent discussion. Specifically, the chapter explains the relationships between vision, mission, strategy, and structure. The study defines the types of organizational structures and provides figures for graphical understanding. Emerging organizational arrangements are discussed to understand hybrid affiliations and constructs. Finally, reasons to change an organization are highlighted in order to provide a foundational recommendation for immediate, short-term, and long-term Geographic Combatant Command headquarters (GCCM HQ) constructs.

“A vision expresses an organization’s fundamental aspirations and purpose, usually by appealing to its members’ hearts and minds.”² A vision is enduring and transcends all of an organization’s mission sets. It is usually not defined by outside factors, but instead by internal goals and desires. Since vision is a rallying cry for all members of an organization, it is good practice for the President, CEO, leader, or commander to continually remind all personnel of the organization’s vision. Further, employees are usually bolstered when their job responsibility and the organization’s vision are linked with purpose.

¹ John Bartlett, *Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations*, ed. Justin Kaplan (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 500.

² Don Hellriegel, Susan Jackson, and John Slocum, *Management, A Competency-Based Approach*, 10 Ed. (Canada: South-Western, 2005), 181.

Similarly, an organization's mission must be known and understood by all employees/members including those who provide support and are not directly in the chain of command. Joint Publication 1 defines mission as:

An organization's mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, the mission is a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task.³

The mission is usually tied to the interests and objectives from higher authority; thus, it is derived from external authority. For example, the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG, guidance from the Secretary of Defense, but approved by the President) listed ten primary missions for the U.S. Armed Forces. Albeit ambiguous, each of the missions provides task, purpose, action, and reason for organizations within the U.S. Armed Forces. The mission sets provide granularity and specificity as lower echelons within the armed services determine their responsibilities.

In military circles, each echelon normally develops a mission statement to provide focus for its efforts. The mission statement should include an explanation of the organization and its purpose. According to JP 1-02, the mission statement is a

short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task (or tasks) and purpose — a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, but seldom specifies how.⁴

The mission statement must conform to the vision of the organization. Together, the organization's vision and mission provide purpose and direction for its personnel.

³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 7, 2007, Incorporating Change 1, March 20, 2009), I-21.

⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010, As Amended Through May 15, 2011), 241.

According to JP 1-02, strategy is “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”⁵ An organization’s strategy links its vision, mission, resources and capabilities, and its external environment by shaping its structure to achieve success. For example, a company wanting to enter the international market by selling its successful national product would first prepare an international strategy. The new strategy would address all issues relative to the international expansion and assess its associated risks. It would likely include marketing, production, and sales in regions targeted as the best markets. The company would then need to reorganize to include the international divisions and/or functional areas to oversee the expansion. Structure follows strategy.

An organization’s structure includes vertical and horizontal designs, and is dependent on the organization’s mission and strategy. The vertical design includes the hierarchical relationships and key leader span-of-control, as well as their respective authority, delegation, responsibility, and accountability prescribed to them (to conduct business). The horizontal design is the actual structure and includes the functional, divisional (or product), geographic, network, matrix, and hybrid constructs. Elements of the vertical design exist in every organization regardless of strategy, but their relationships vary. Elements of horizontal design are holistically dependent on strategy. The terms network and hybrid are not new to organization theory, but emerging structures based on these constructs are new, and are discussed later in this chapter.

⁵ Ibid., 349.

Vertical Design

Vertical Design defines the relationships between people and groups within the organization. It is the way people work together for the greater good of the organization. Hierarchy, span-of-control, authority, responsibility, and accountability encompass the vertical design of an organization. A review of each of these terms provides foundational understanding of the structural relationships necessary for an organization to function properly. The span-of-control is of particular interest because it is discussed throughout this paper as it applies to the CEO and Commander.

The hierarchical relationships in an organization establish linear patterns of control by distributing tasks and responsibilities among management. Hierarchy “is a pyramid showing relationships among levels.”⁶ The sergeant reports to the company commander, who reports to the battalion commander, who reports to the Brigade commander, and so forth. The hierarchy is the reporting construct in an organization that provides efficiencies in completing tasks/assignments in a linear fashion as well as the exchanging of information between levels, or echelons. There is no formula to determine the right hierarchy, but understanding that ten levels are less efficient than three provides impetus for evaluating the structure of an organization. GE’s “wide-spread feeling [was] that five layers was the maximum with which any large organization could function effectively.”⁷ “Most executives think that having fewer layers creates a more efficient organization that can react faster to competition and is more cost effective....having fewer hierarchical levels permits more people to participate in the decision-making

⁶ Hellriegel, Jackson, and Slocum, *Management, A Competency-Based Approach*, 301.

⁷ The Economist, *Span of Control* (The Economist Newspaper Limited, London, November 9, 2009), 1.

process.”⁸ Therefore, minimizing the number of levels in an organization ensures efficiencies are realized as decision-making information is exchanged.

Span-of-Control “refers to the number of employees directly reporting to a person.”⁹ In order to simplify his span-of-control, large organizations limit the number of personnel (normally 6 to 25) reporting to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to reduce the number of competing interests, or persons, for his/her time and attention. “It was once thought that there was a single ideal span-of-control based on some fundamental human capacity.”¹⁰ However, the ideal span-of-control remains a source for debate; and with the birth of virtual structures/organizations, span-of-control may forever be dependent on one’s subjective choice vice defined by research. That said, the CEO’s or Commander’s span-of-control cannot be calculated using objective data, but must be figured subjectively from the type industry, or mission, and the firm, or headquarters itself. “GE’s guideline was that no managers should have more than 10-15 people reporting to them directly.”¹¹ Current CCDRs have anywhere from 9 to 19 people directly reporting to him within the GCCM HQ alone. When including the service components and subordinate commands, the CCDR’s span-of-control can and does exceed twenty. Determining the optimum span-of-control at the top of the organization impacts the structure as a whole. “Narrow spans of control lead to more hierarchical levels....wider spans create a flatter organization with fewer hierarchical levels. The span-of-control can either be too wide, too narrow, or appropriate.”¹² Emphasis must be placed on ensuring the head of an organization maintains sufficient span-of-control over

⁸ Hellriegel, Jackson, and Slocum, *Management, A Competency-Based Approach*, 301.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ The Economist, *Span of Control*, 1.

¹¹ Ibid., 2.

¹² Hellriegel, Jackson, and Slocum, *Management, A Competency-Based Approach*, 301.

his staff and subordinates, as not to over-tax his/her ability or create a micromanaging atmosphere.

Authority is defined as “the right to make a decision.”¹³ A company’s board of directors, its shareholders, or its owner decides who makes the decisions at the company’s senior level. In the military, commanders are selected and then given their authority by law, or some legal means that gives the right to make decisions for the good of the nation. Some command positions allow for the commander to delegate some of their authority to subordinates in order to lend specificity to a function or mission. Delegation “is the process of giving authority to a person (or group or team) to make decisions and act in certain situations.”¹⁴ According to JP 1-02, the delegation of authority is “the action by which a commander assigns part of his or her authority commensurate with the assigned task to a subordinate commander.”¹⁵ Both are explicitly defined in writing so each party understands their role, responsibility, and functions that come with such a position within the organization.

Furthermore, some command positions, like CCDRs, carry some authorities they cannot delegate. However, many CCDRs delegate authority to subordinate commanders to conduct specific missions within the CCMD’s AOR. It is important to note that “while ultimate responsibility cannot be relinquished, delegation of authority carries with it the imposition of a measure of responsibility.”¹⁶ Hellriegel defines responsibility as “an employee’s duty to perform the assigned task.”¹⁷ Similarly, JP 1-02 defines responsibility as “the obligation to carry forward an assigned task to a successful

¹³ Ibid., 302.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02*, 102.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Hellriegel, Jackson, and Slocum, *Management, A Competency-Based Approach*, 302.

conclusion. With responsibility goes authority to direct and take the necessary action to ensure success. The obligation for the proper custody, care, and safekeeping of property or funds entrusted to the possession or supervision of an individual.”¹⁸ To distinguish, “accountability is concerned primarily with records, while responsibility is concerned primarily with custody, care, and safekeeping.”¹⁹ Staff personnel and commanders alike must understand the differences between the two in order to effectively conduct day-to-day exchanges between peers, subordinates, commands, and commanders.

According to Hellriegel, accountability “is the manager’s expectation that the employee will accept credit or blame for his work.”²⁰ This definition is from a business management perspective, which does not fully capture the military meaning. JP 1-02 defines accountability as “the obligation imposed by law or lawful order or regulation on an officer or other person for keeping accurate record of property, documents, or funds.”²¹ It is important to note that the meaning is dependent on one’s perspective.

Horizontal Design

Horizontal Design defines the fiscal structure of the organization. It is the way personnel are positioned to work for the greater good of the organization. As stated earlier, several types of structures make up horizontal design, and this section explains those relevant to military designs. The functional, divisional, geographic, and matrix structures are connected linearly and, thus, are susceptible to disorganized expansion and inefficiency. Linear structures are rigid and difficult to re-organize without extensive overhauling; however, network and hybrid organizations are not linear, but rather

¹⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02*, 314.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁰ Hellriegel, Jackson, and Slocum, *Management, A Competency-Based Approach*, 302.

²¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02*, 1.

connected through technological means such as the telephone and the internet. The network and hybrid organizations easily change shape as needs and requirements dictate, but are more complex. Understanding the advantages and disadvantages of each type of organization provides clarity on how to reorganize a GCCM headquarters.

Functional design is the simplest hierarchical form of horizontal design and is usually used in small and/or less complex organizations. “Functional design means grouping managers and employees according to their areas of expertise and the resources used to perform their jobs.”²² An organization with an exclusive functional design is generally smaller and not very complex, but can produce a high volume of a narrow range of products. Examples include Harley-Davidson, Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas, and Boeing; all of which have one manager, an Assistant Chief of Staff, or Director that all personnel report to and receive guidance from. Directors have no command authority but have decision-making authority and responsibilities they receive from upper management/leadership within the organization. Functional design requires collaboration, but is easily slowed by bureaucratic growth and tendencies. Figure 1 illustrates a simple functional design.




Figure 1: Functional Design²³

²² Hellriegel, Jackson, and Slocum, *Management, A Competency-Based Approach*, 306.

²³ Ibid.

Divisional design (or Product Design) means that all efforts contribute to one manager's area of responsibility, whether it is a product, geographic region, customer, or any other specific interest. Divisional design for a product "means that all functions that contribute to a product are organized under one manager."²⁴ Organizations that have more complex operations use this type of construct. It is usually division by customer or product. Many functions, areas, and interests require attention from one manager who is able to see the entire picture, and thus affect every phase of the process. Organizing by division allows managers to focus multiple resources for the good of one product. It is highly flexible and has the ability to respond to change, but is very susceptible to duplication of effort between divisions. This structure does not foster a collaborative atmosphere because each manager can accomplish their duties and assignments without assistance from other divisions. Figure 2 illustrates a simple divisional design by product.

²⁴ Ibid., 307.




Figure 2: Divisional (Product) Design²⁵

Organizing **Geographically** is usually advantageous when the area of interest requires the responsible party to have a working knowledge of its cultures, customs, religions, etc. “Geographical design organizes activities around location.”²⁶ The geographic division allows an organization to focus efforts in a specific area, as well as to maintain cultural awareness, political influences, economic dynamism, narrowed security concerns, and social nuances. Multiple products and services interact within that area, but only one manager, or leader, is responsible for their use. Six of the U.S. Unified Commands are organized along this design. However, the global dynamics and broad security challenges today are eroding geographic boundaries. As a result, staff structures and processes are evolving through partnerships and mutual understandings with other GCCMs. The global challenges, i.e. illicit trafficking, proliferation of WMD, and transnational threats, are without borders, and the CCMDs are structurally evolving to

²⁵ Ibid., 308.

²⁶ Ibid., 309.

combat such threats to national security. Figure 3 illustrates a simple geographic divisional structure.




Figure 3: Geographical Design²⁷

The use of a **Network design** is usually the result of an organization requiring a specialty for a single event or for a short duration, thereby reducing the overhead required if made permanent. Savings are realized in manpower and monetary costs. “A network design subcontracts some or many of its operations to other firms and coordinates them to accomplish specific goals.”²⁸ Figure 4 illustrates this type of organization structure. It relies on connections with other outside organizations to make it whole. Work is subcontracted to other companies for a specified period, job, or function. The organization is dependent on technology and processes to establish and maintain links to the outside agencies. The organization does not require full-time, organic capability within its ranks, thus it outsources to fill a short-term need. According to Keegan, “at the

²⁷ Ibid., 311.

²⁸ Ibid., 310.

heart of each [network] structure is the fundamental principle that a number of different organizations, companies, and individuals work together on a common business project.”²⁹ Military organizations generally rely on organic resources and personnel, and capitalizing on the whole-of-government (WOG) approach may provide resource and manpower savings through the use of networking and/or reach-back. One example involves a forward deployed unit remotely connecting with its home unit in the U.S. for technical and information support. Currently, GCCM HQ use a form of reach-back through their command liaisons when operations cross regional boundaries or areas of responsibility.




Figure 4: Network (Virtual) Design³⁰

²⁹ Warren J. Keegan, *Global Marketing Management*, 7th Ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), 523.

³⁰ Hellriegel, Jackson, and Slocum, *Management, A Competency-Based Approach*, 313.

A **Matrix organization** combines two managers' areas of responsibility where one manages a product or project, and the other manages a geographic area or department. The two managers work together for success by combining a functional and divisional structure. The key trait that distinguishes a matrix organization is collaboration. Two managers of equal authority, regardless of echelon, must work together to achieve success. However, the managers have no prescribed hierarchical relationship with one another, but must pool together their respective authorities and responsibilities to advance the organization's interests through a collaborative relationship. According to Keegan, "in a matrix, influence is based on technical competence and interpersonal sensitivity, not on formal authority."³¹ In the military, this arrangement may appear to defy the unity of command principle, but as long as there is higher competent authority above the echelon of the managers/commanders, then the command can realize unity of command and effort. The upper echelon of the International Security Assistance Forces' (ISAF's) current structure is currently set up as a matrix organization. The military commander and the Senior Civilian Representative share the same rank (military-four star and SCR-four star equivalent), but have different responsibilities and authorities as assigned by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leadership. This relationship is discussed in the next chapter. Figure 5 illustrates the basic matrix organization. Drawing from this diagram is the inference that a project manager and department manager must collaborate to accomplish their assigned tasks. Where their interests, or nodes, meet bring together mission, resources, and time.

³¹ Keegan, Global Marketing Management, 520.




Figure 5. Basic Matrix Organization³²

The **Hybrid organization** may contain elements of all of the previously discussed designs, plus a few models identified recently. Hybrid is the new catch phrase for complex organizations that span multiple designs. Strategic planning groups, starbursts, strategic alliances, and networks (previously discussed) are structures used by large international firms in today's global environment. The vast distances, varied cultures, ever-changing markets, improved technologies, and greater transportation opportunities are some of the reasons international organizations are changing their structures. The degree and pace of organizational change depend on many variables; these hybrid structures provide possibilities for strategic leaders to use for optimizing their organization's interests.

Strategic planning groups (SPGs) “involve multidisciplinary or cross-functional ...teams whose purpose is to implement centrally developed policies and strategies with a

³² University of Missouri – St. Louis,
http://www.umsl.edu/~sauterv/analysis/f06Papers/Laroche/index_files/figure2_OrgChartMatrix.gif
 (accessed January 20, 2013).

local focus.”³³ They are formed from individuals or teams within the organization, but are in different directorates or departments. If their teams are not co-located, organizations must use networking technology and periodic forums to collaborate their efforts. SPGs are used in many ways. The best example of using an SPG in the military is the use of the operational planning team (OPT). OPTs are formed for short periods of time to focus on one particular project as assigned by higher authority. Its success is dependent on the manager/leader to coalesce the effort toward achievable goals and objectives. The leader focuses inward on group dynamics and work efforts, and the tasking authority ensures the group links their efforts to the whole of the organization. For example, the J-3 Director forms an OPT and selects one member to lead the group effort. The director ensures the group works for the good of the command, and the OPT lead ensures they deliver what the J-3 director needs.

Starbursts are structures developed within an organization in order to bring focus to a new product or service that later detach themselves to form a subsidiary. The frequency of establishing OPTs for similar focus areas may identify, through trends, the need to form a separate, external organization. The newly formed organization would then focus on their mission to support multiple agencies or companies. The subsidiary remains a part of the organization, but operates as a separate entity from which it originated. The larger organization expands while simplifying the relationship between the subsidiary and its parent company.

Another type of hybrid organization is the **Strategic Alliance** that is normally founded on inter-organizational relationships.³⁴ According to *Business Dictionary.com*, a

³³ Keegan, Global Marketing Management, 523.

³⁴ Keegan, Global Marketing Management, 523.

strategic alliance is an “agreement for cooperation among two or more independent firms to work together toward common objectives. Unlike in a joint venture, firms in a strategic alliance do not form a new entity to further their aims but collaborate while remaining apart and distinct.”³⁵ This arrangement requires a competent authority to enter into such an arrangement, and, in the military, this is usually left to other agencies to complete. Strategic alliances usually use political and involve diplomatic efforts from the Department of State (DOS) to aid in their establishment. Once established, the military will conform to its tasks and mission sets according to the alliance. If militaries form an alliance, appropriate authority must be granted to the senior leaders involved to enact an agreement.

Current GCCM Structure

Current GCCM HQ are organized using multi-divisional, functional, matrix, and network structures. GCCMs use the functional design as a subset within a complex structure where divisional and functional lines are distinguished only by the task, issue, or mission sets. The J-code staff, as described in JP-1, is functional and divisional in appearance (wire diagram) but often relies on matrix and network design elements; thus, it is a hybrid construct. According to Feickert, the

basic configurations of CCMD staffs are generally the same and mirror the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. CCMD staffs are organized as follows (although there are variations based on unique CCMD mission areas):

- □ J-1 Directorate of Manpower and Personnel;
- □ J-2 Directorate of Intelligence;
- □ J-3 Directorate of Operations;
- □ J-4 Directorate of Logistics;

³⁵ Business Dictionary.com, “Strategic Alliance”, <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/strategic-alliance.html#ixzz2IWmzjJmP> (accessed Jan 20, 2013).

- □ J-5 Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy;
- □ J-6 Directorate of Command, Control, Communication, and Computer;
- □ J-7 Directorate of Operational Planning and Joint Force Development;
- □ J-8 Directorate of Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment; and
- □ J-9 Directorate of Interagency Partnering

Within the CCMD command and staff construct, Joint Task Forces (JTFs) are often created to address a single policy concern and allocate resources, such as anti-drug efforts or humanitarian assistance, on a short to mid-term basis. JTFs can also be established in response to a crisis or for a long-term commitment.³⁶

JTFs are normally starburst organizations created to focus on one mission set and are normally disbanded once they accomplish their mission. JP-1 aligns the GCCM HQ with the JTF staff construct. Keeping the staff construct similar across commands provides commonality in function and language. In 2008, USSOUTHCOM reorganized their HQ staff under functional directorates, i.e. Policy and Strategy, Stability, etc. When the earthquake struck Haiti in 2010, efforts between the USSOUTHCOM staff and external staffs did not align. The CDR did not structure the SOUTHCOM staff correctly. To reduce misunderstandings and to focus external efforts and assistance, the CDR realigned his staff using the J-code directorates. Arguably, the functional lines during steady-state operations were benefiting the organization; however, the staff had to reorganize when external factors changed the steady-state operations. Communication between agencies and higher-headquarters was easier after the staff realignment. Among other lessons learned, USSOUTHCOM's J-code staff structure conformed to its parent organization, aligning cumulative efforts and language.

Fundamentally, the HQ Staff's reason for existence is to advise and inform the commander. From a corporate perspective, the GCCM headquarters are responsible for strategic planning, appraisal, and allocation of resources; however, current CCMD staffs

³⁶ Congressional Research Service, *The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 3, 2013), 14.

engage in activities that may be construed as tactical actions. Staffs must know and understand their responsibilities and authorities, and those of the relevant commands and commanders. Organizations grow larger and more complex, and sometimes more unorganized and unwieldy, due to unguided or ill-defined pursuits for information. When organizations remain unchecked for some time they are likely to attain bureaucratic processes that stifle efficiency while not adhering to their primary purpose of supporting the commander. Returning to the basics of advising the commander is a primary reason for reorganizing the staffs of today's GCCM HQ.

CHAPTER 2

Case Studies

“Tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis [Times change, and we change with them too]”

-- Anonymous, From OWEN’S Epigrammata [1615]¹

This chapter provides two case studies as the basis for Geographic Combatant Command Headquarters (GCCM HQ) structural recommendations. The General Electric Company (GE) provides a model of a large, international firm. It provides a good example of a Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO) span-of-control, both vertical and horizontal design, and the nature of evolutionary restructuring as a result of leadership and operating environmental changes. GE also illustrates how the structure of an organization changes as strategy is realized through operations. The second case study describes International Security Assistance Forces’ (ISAF) current organizational structure that is headquartered in Kabul, Afghanistan. The author discusses it to shed light on the workings of a multinational organization that also capitalizes on the whole-of-government (WOG) approach across multiple organizations. The ISAF HQ organization demonstrates how a dual chain-of-command effectively operates, how unity of effort is achieved, how unity of command is realized, and how strategy drives its structure.

General Electric Company

Founded in Schenectady, NY in 1892, the General Electric Company (GE) is one of the world’s largest international firms. It is a multi-business, multinational

¹ John Bartlett, *Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations*, ed. Justin Kaplan (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 124.

conglomerate with its headquarters in Fairfield, Connecticut and has many offices around the world. GE is known as a conglomerate because it has many unrelated organizations under its umbrella, and it continually buys and sells whole businesses in order to remain profitable and viable in the international economy. Relevant to this discussion are GE's vertical and horizontal organization, its strategic planning influence on organizational structure, and its deciding factors for restructuring.

At the top of the company are the Shareowners, the Board of Directors, and the Corporate Executive Office. Presently, Mr. Jeffrey R. Immelt is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the Board. There are three Vice Chairmen, two of which also run a Segment (division) of the corporation. The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is a Vice Chairman, but doesn't lead a segment of the corporation. There are six corporate staff areas: Commercial, Public Relations; Business Development; Legal; Global Research; Human Resources; and Finance.²

Currently, there are *Segments* below the Corporate Executive Office that report directly to the CEO. GE uses the term *Segment* to capture the full extent of the divisions which fall under its span-of-control. Corporate Executives, or growth leaders, are at the top of these Segments. Within each Segment are Divisions headed by Business Executives, who report to their respective Corporate Executive. Below the Business Executives are the middle managers and floor workers. GE keeps the reporting chain short, efficient, and relevant; this is the key to their work philosophy and business success. Chart 5, in Appendix A, depicts the current GE organizational structure as of

² GE Company Organization Chart, http://www.ge.com/pdf/company/ge_organization_chart.pdf (accessed 21 January 2013).

October, 2012. Table 1, below, lists some of the Segments GE has used since 2001. The author discusses this table in detail later in this section.

<u>2001</u>	<u>2002</u>	<u>2004</u>
1. GE Aircraft Engines	1. GE Power Systems	1. GE Transportation
2. GE Appliances	2. GE Medical Systems	2. GE Energy
3. GE Industrial Products & Systems	3. GE Aircraft Engines	3. GE Healthcare
4. GE Medical Systems Lunar	4. GECAS (Aircraft Leasing)	4. GE Infrastructure
5. GE Plastics	5. GE Plastics	5. GE Advanced Materials
6. GE Power Systems	6. GE Consumer Products	6. GE Consumer & Industrial
7. GE Technical Products & Services	7. GE Industrial Systems	7. GE Equipment & Other Services
8. GE Capital	8. GE Specialty Materials	8. GE Insurance
9. NBC	9. NBC	9. NBC Universal
10. OEC Medical Systems, Inc.	10. Consumer Finance	10. Consumer Finance
	11. Commercial Finance	11. Commercial Finance
	12. GE Equipment Management	
	13. GE Insurance	
<u>2005</u>	<u>March, 2008</u>	<u>July, 2008</u>
1. Healthcare	1. Infrastructure	1. Energy Infrastructure
2. Infrastructure	2. Commercial Finance	2. Technology Infrastructure
3. Industrial	3. GE Money	3. GE Capital
4. NBC Universal	4. Healthcare	4. NBC Universal
5. Consumer Finance	5. NBC Universal	
6. Commercial Finance	6. Industrial	
<u>March, 2010</u>	<u>February, 2011</u>	<u>October, 2012</u>
1. Energy Infrastructure	1. Global Growth & Operations	1. Global Growth & Operations
2. Technology Infrastructure	2. Energy	2. Energy Management
3. GE Capital	3. Capital	3. Oil & Gas
4. NBC Universal	4. Home & Business Solutions	4. Power & Water
	5. Healthcare	5. Capital
	6. Aviation	6. Home & Business Solutions
	7. Transportation	7. Healthcare
		8. Aviation
		9. Transportation

Table 1. GE Divisions from 2001 to 2012³

The headquarters staff integrates actions for all of its businesses, and provides strategic direction and leadership for all of its employees, board members, and shareowners. GE's headquarters staff is small but extremely efficient. "The company has few management layers – commonly with only four or five layers from a line manager to the CEO. There are few corporate staff members, but the people who work at the corporate level play powerful and important roles as facilitators who help the

³ The divisions provided were compiled by the author using GE's annual reports from relative years.

businesses evolve across boundaries.”⁴ The key to the organization is a simplified vertical design that capitalizes on layering to divest authority, responsibility, and span-of-control. Horizontally, the organization is a hybrid because it uses variations of functional, divisional, network, and matrix structures. GE relies on its ability to morph into new shapes to capitalize quickly on emerging technology, markets, and trends. The hybrid construct is best for such a large company because it enables it to reorganize at any and all levels with little to no effect on its operations.

GE uses a decentralized process of reporting throughout the corporation. Cooperation, communication, and collaboration exist from CEO to floor workers. Throughout the year, board members, executives and business managers are required to visit several operations within the company. Emphasis on every visit is talking with the middle managers and floor employees, and to meet with relevant suppliers, distributors, and customers. Officials share feedback from these visits during key meetings of the corporate officers and managers. The information is current, relevant, and used to impact current operations and strategic direction. The decentralized process has been a main force within the organization for over fifty years, and it remains critical to its success today.⁵

Strategic planning, the external environment, and current operations influence GE’s organizational structure. GE is a growth company, thus its overarching strategy is to continually experience growth to be a profitable organization. Each year, the CEO communicates his strategic imperatives or strategic agenda to achieve the company’s

⁴ William Mitchell, “Transforming a Successful Company: General Electric’s Organizational Strategy,” (Duke University, 2008), 2.

⁵ The information in this paragraph was garnered from reading all of GE’s annual reports from 2001 to 2011.

growth strategy. These imperatives, or the *agenda*, remain in place with only slight changes as long as the company meets its financial goals. Its strategy determines the company's focus for the next ten years, and is annually assessed using a strict process that began in the 1940s and 1950s. It starts with a corporate executive meeting at the beginning of each calendar year and is followed by subsequent meetings throughout the year to include all management levels from the bottom up. The annual report to investors serves as a medium to broadcast the company's strategy and is attached to the company's intranet for all employees to reference.

GE has morphed since 2001 as its leadership, operating environment, and strategy evolved. As illustrated in Table 1, GE's structure expanded and contracted as required to meet new challenges and remain viable. Mr. Jeff Immelt became CEO in September, 2001, and he adhered to the strategy in place until late 2002 when he changed it to meet his intent. He reorganized GE by growing to 13 businesses (from 11) with the main change being the modification of the GE Capital segment (reference Table 1 to see the organizational differences between 2001 and 2002). The reorganization demonstrated Mr. Immelt's philosophy to shape the strategic direction of GE five key elements focused on company growth.⁶ At the end of 2003, after spending nearly eighteen months focused on the five key elements of his strategy, Mr. Immelt again reorganized the company into eleven businesses, or *segments* (reference Table 1). The reason for this change was three-fold: new CEOs generally make organizational changes that match their vision and philosophy; the global economy was accelerating; and GE was changing their growth

⁶ Five key elements: 1) Technical leadership that expands margins and grows the installed base; 2) Services acceleration that improves returns, competitiveness and customer satisfaction; 3) Enduring customer relationships that are unbreakable because we win together over the long term; 4) Globalization as a way to grow faster and be more competitive; and 5) Resource reallocation to build positions in new markets where we can achieve superior growth and returns. GE 2002 Annual Report, 9.

strategy from one dependent on financial markets to one dependent on industrial markets. GE's financial businesses were profitable, but growth was slowing, and there were signs the industry was becoming more risky. GE began selling its insurance business and downsizing its banking sectors. In addition, GE expanded their media business by purchasing Universal and renaming that segment NBC Universal. The company's focus shifted to a new segment called **Infrastructure**. GE increased research & development (R&D) and accelerated acquisitions in the technology sector. GE was laying the foundation for becoming a leader in product manufacturing; a strategy not yet publicized.

GE leadership looks at the root causes in the event profits and growth do not meet expectations. For example, in the 1990s, GE invested in financial markets such as commercial lending, insurance, and commercial leasing. GE has long been in the finance business; however, during the early 2000s GE was earning over 50% of its profits from this sector alone. Mr. Immelt felt GE was too dependent on financials and his team assessed the global environment as being ripe for changing GE's strategy from one that emphasized the financial sector to one based on industrial manufacturing. The strategy was to divest unprofitable and slower-growth financial businesses, expand their media interests, and begin shaping the infrastructure and industrial sectors.

A prime example of GE making organizational changes as it realized its strategy involved its insurance and plastics businesses. In 2002, GE Capital reorganized into four businesses, one of which was Insurance. GE leadership realized the Insurance business was not meeting expectations and the global market in this area was fracturing. Therefore, knowing they were shifting growth strategy from financial to industrial, Mr. Immelt reorganized GE Capital such that it could divest itself from riskier businesses like

Insurance (reference Table 1). In 2005, GE reorganized from eleven segments to six, and GE removed Insurance from the portfolio. Similarly, GE Plastics was a money-maker since the 1980s, but profits and growth slowed in the early 2000s. GE Plastics did not meet the company's strategic needs and was sold in mid-2007. Monies from that transaction were invested in energy and infrastructure, i.e., the new strategic focus.

The operating environment influenced GE's organizational structure heavily from 2008 to 2010. The global recession and GE's shift from financial to industrial collided during these years, and GE's structure reflected the impact. Looking at Mr. Immelt's tenure as CEO, the structure of GE made seven significant changes, mostly from 2008 to 2011. Between 2002 and 2008, GE's number of segments decreased from thirteen to four, but between 2010 and 2012 expanded back to nine (reference Charts 1-5, Appendix B). Although the overall growth strategy did not change, the operational strategy did due to the global economy and the shift in company focus. The number of segments nearly parallels the timing of the global recession and subsequent rebound, i.e. fewer segments at the heart of the recession.

At present, when current operations call for organizational changes, the CEO offers recommendations to the Board of Directors for approval. For example, the recent reorganization of GE Energy into three divisions (Oil & Gas, Energy Management, and Power & Water) was the result of a changing operational environment. The Energy sector as a whole was growing and, to a degree, the three divisions were operating independently. GE Energy's CEO, Mr. John Krenicki, effectively worked himself out of a job by growing the sector into three large companies from 2008 until the summer of 2012. Mr. Immelt then recommended the dissolution of GE Energy and the formation of

three sectors based on Mr. Krenicki's recommendation. GE Energy had grown too big and too diverse for one Segment to manage. Thus, General Electric's CEO and Board of Directors decided upon and approved the decision to create three Segments from the one. GE made an organizational change because it realized one part of its strategy in the energy sector in 2012 that they started in 2006.

GE emphasizes a small span-of-control by delegating responsibilities and authorities to the lowest echelons while minimizing the number of decision makers in the chain of command. The company executives focus on GE's strategic direction and the subordinate executives are responsible for their departments to achieve the overall operational end states of their *Segment*. Furthermore, the subordinate decision-makers in each department are responsible for the company's day-to-day operations. GE successfully separates the strategic focus from the daily (tactical) focus by empowering their management and workers in a culture founded on trust and GE values.

GE uses a few simple approaches that are fundamental to its external and internal strategies. The external approaches focus on technology, products, and markets that bring profits to the company commensurate with corporate guidance. The internal approaches ensure employees are trained, informed, empowered, and entrusted. GE blends planning, training, and information sharing among its employees in order to sustain current operations, sense potential acquisitions, and leverage strategic alliances.

GE's external strategy focuses on acquisitions and alliances. "General Electric buys dozens of firms every year,"⁷ and it sells dozens of firms each year as well. From its strategy, GE empowers its lower level executives and managers to look for opportunities, including those to acquire other businesses. "General Electric has a highly

⁷ Mitchell, Transforming a Successful Company: General Electric's Organizational Strategy, 1.

organized acquisition strategy, including both careful pre-acquisition assessment and detailed post-acquisition integration.”⁸ As motivation, GE rewards its employees for sharing such ideas and opportunities. GE furthers its reach into the global economy through strategic alliances, targeting on what benefits GE and for what duration it will remain viable. “GE initiates dozens of major alliances every year, plus many other smaller relationships. The ventures help GE gain access to technology, products, and markets throughout the world.”⁹ GE continues to profit from its acquisitions and alliances through employee involvement and solid executive decision-making.

GE’s internal strategy combines employee programs, information sharing through technologies and processes, and strategic planning within several corporate levels. Much time and extensive company resources go into a “few high-powered programs.”¹⁰ These programs focus on internal and external factors affecting the company. The key to their success is the depth to which they reach every employee, and that senior-level management commits to their success. Also, many programs focus on customers, suppliers, and distributors to help shape GE’s external environment.

GE bases its information sharing on a “highly-developed knowledge management system. A small staff that reports to senior levels of the corporation is responsible for identifying opportunities to take ideas from one business and use them in other businesses, and for facilitating knowledge transfer opportunities that business leaders identify.”¹¹ The company’s intranet is the key to information sharing among its employees. Corporate’s small staff is able to review, learn, and understand the various

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., 2.

¹¹ Ibid.

working components around the organization such that the best ideas are brought to senior leader attention. The best ideas are then instituted in some or all of the GE workings and/or businesses. Effectively, GE shares lessons learned through an operational assessment process that affords its senior leaders raw ideas for use in incrementally transforming the company.

“The strategic plan includes high-level goals and detailed objectives for individual divisions and operating units. Managers are accountable to shape the plan and to meet their objectives.”¹² GE’s leadership has used strategic planning since the 1940s, and it has evolved into a critically fundamental component within the organization. In fact, much of the corporate structure, external of the normal reporting chain, focuses on strategic planning. “Strategic planning has been a distributed activity under all [of the past CEOs], with CEO and top management involvement as well as participation from both line and staff...The Corporate Executive Committee links both line and staff activities.”¹³

Restructuring the organization occurs often and is usually the result of two changes: change in leadership and/or change in the operating environment. Every CEO has reorganized the corporation at some point in their tenure. He restructures based on his vision, insight, and method of leadership, and in some cases due to the changing global environment. This is true of GE’s last six CEOs. Charles E. Wilson (de facto CEO from 1940-1950) provided three major initiatives for his corporate agenda: “1) planning for war production and mobilization, 2) post-war production and organization,

¹² Ibid.

¹³ William Ocasio and John Joseph, “Rise and Fall – or Transformation? The Evolution of Strategic Planning at the General Electric Company, 1940-2006,” *Long Range Planning* 41(2008), 267.

and 3) the development of a decentralized management organization.”¹⁴ Ralph J. Cordiner (GE President from 1950-1963) “implemented the previously planned radical decentralization of the corporation, which fundamentally altered GE’s management and planning practices. The reorganization decentralized operations within GE at three levels below the President, and separated the operating units from corporate staff functions.”¹⁵ Fred J. Borch (Chief Executive Officer (then known as CXO) from 1963-1972) “instituted a series of corporate reorganizations,”¹⁶ formed several entities such as the Corporate Executive Office, the Corporate Policy Board, the Growth Council; and put planning staffs at every level in the corporation from the top to the Groups to the Divisions, and finally to the Department level. Reginald H. Jones (CXO 1972-1981) “reorganized the company into Sectors, and Groups, and SBUs”¹⁷ (Strategic Business Units). John F. Welch (CEO from 1981-2001) brought “extensive restructuring, elimination of bureaucratic layers, [and drastic reductions in] the headcount, and [was responsible for] largely reducing corporate staff.”¹⁸ Interesting to military scholars was the formation of the Corporate Initiatives Group by Mr. Welch, which is very similar in name and function to our current Commander’s Initiative Group, or CIG. Finally, Jeffrey R. Immelt (CEO from 2001-Present) first reorganized eleven business units into thirteen, and then made five more changes in the last ten years. Currently GE has nine business units according to their industry focus.

The organizational changes GE made over several years were a direct result of strategy being realized through operations and the external environmental impacts

¹⁴ Ibid., 253.

¹⁵ Ibid., 254.

¹⁶ Ibid., 256.

¹⁷ Ibid., 258.

¹⁸ Ibid., 260.

surrounding the global recession. GE corporate executives provide the strategic direction for the company and organize the segments to achieve continued growth. The company capitalizes on its size, culture, values, and people to achieve its strategic goals. Additionally, it's vertical and horizontal organization, its strategic planning influence on organizational structure, and its decisive restructuring all factor into its 127 years of success.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

This case study focuses on the evolution of the ISAF command structure from its inception to present day, with emphasis on the changes between 2008 and 2009. The discussion includes strategic change and its impact on the organization relative to unity of command, unity of effort, and civilian participation, as well as the commander's span-of-control. The ISAF headquarters (ISAF HQ) structure envelops a multinational and multiagency approach that continues to evolve as ISAF achieves its strategic and operational objectives. The ISAF organization serves as a working experiment where political and military leaders share equal ranks with different reporting chains where they must coordinate their efforts in order for each to succeed. Considering the current emphasis on such approaches to conflict by the United States, the United Kingdom, and others, ISAF may afford us the structure from which we venture into the future.

The U.S. operations in Afghanistan, i.e. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), began shortly after September 11, 2001, and a coalition effort ensued. Initial U.S. involvement was mainly operational with the parallel startup of nascent training of the Afghan forces. Initially, NATO forces only contributed to the OEF effort. However, "on August 9, 2003, NATO assumed responsibility for the ISAF mission, which was

established by UN mandate in December 2001 and led until mid-2003 by a series of lead nations.”¹⁹ ISAF initially assumed the stability and reconstruction efforts beginning in the northern region of Afghanistan. A phased approach to ISAF assumption of responsibilities by region began and, from 2003 until 2006, ISAF’s presence spread from the north to the west then to the rest of the country. Meanwhile, the U.S. called the OEF headquarters in-country the Combined Forces Command, Afghanistan (CFC-A). Additionally, the U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command, Afghanistan (CSTC-A) was a multi-national command overseeing the training, development, and transition of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). At the time, “the mission of...CSTC-A [was] to plan, program and implement structural, organizational, institutional, and management reforms of the ANSF in order to develop a stable Afghanistan, strengthen the rule of law, and deter and defeat insurgency and terrorism within its borders.”²⁰ ISAF assumed the security mission in Afghanistan in 2007; however, CFC-A remained to lead OEF, and CSTC-A remained to lead the ANSF development transition. In doing so, NATO became the lead organization for both the political and military efforts. By 2008, the competing interests of ISAF and CFC-A required unification; therefore, it was decided that a single commander would lead both commands (reference Chart 1, Appendix C). “Today, NATO leads the International Security Assistance Force, and the United States leads the OEF coalition effort. The U.S. government assigns troops to both missions. The command of these two efforts [was] unified [under a single U.S.

¹⁹ Congressional Research Service, *War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress*, by the Congressional Research Service, December, 3, 2009 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 14.

²⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: January 2009*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington DC: Department of Defense, January, 2009), 34.

commander].”²¹ Keeping unity of command within ISAF was paramount; therefore, the U.S. and NATO decided to appoint a four-star U.S. general to command ISAF, and dual-hat him as the commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), which replaced CFC-A as the U.S. headquarters for OEF. The disposition of CSTC-A remained unchanged until late 2009 and the author discusses it later in this section.

Prior to, and through command unification, the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan was counterinsurgency. “The U.S. continues to pursue a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign which utilizes the military, government, and economic expertise of the U.S. and the international community to diminish insurgent capacity, maintain security, and build the infrastructure and human capital necessary to achieve the *Afghanistan* envisioned in the strategic goals listed above. The current COIN strategy is often referred to as clear, hold, and build.”²² Both U.S. and ISAF forces focused on this strategy; however, there was a difference in missions between OEF and ISAF. “Although both ISAF and OEF support the overarching COIN strategy, they fulfill slightly different but complimentary missions. OEF forces pursue an aggressive counterterrorism role and bear primary responsibility for generating and developing the ANSF; while ISAF forces concentrate on stability and reconstruction operations, including command of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Both OEF and ISAF forces train and mentor the Afghan National Army (ANA).”²³ In the spring of 2009, both the U.S. and NATO would redefine the

²¹ Congressional Research Service, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, by the Congressional Research Service, December, 3, 2009, 13.

²² U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: January 2009, 7.

²³ U.S. Department of Defense, *DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: June 2009*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington DC: Department of Defense, June, 2009), 16.

counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan and begin a period of significant change in the organizational structure of both ISAF and OEF commands.

On March 27, 2009, President Obama updated the U.S. strategy detailed in a DOD progress report: “The core goal for the U.S. in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qaida and its extremist allies, their support structures, and their safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to either country.”²⁴ Several days later NATO accepted the terms of the new COIN strategy by issuing their own vision and guiding principles for their efforts in Afghanistan. They also approved the establishment of a new organizational structure to support the revised strategy. “ISAF officials considered the use of COIN terminology a breakthrough, following years of NATO preference for framing the effort in Afghanistan in terms of stability operations.”²⁵ In November 2009, the U.S. and NATO established the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and the NATO training Mission, Afghanistan (NTM-A) as subordinates to Commander, ISAF (COMISAF) to provide unity of command along operational and developmental lines of effort. “The Commander, NTM-A occupies the dual role of leading both the U.S.-led CSTC-A and NTM-A. The establishment of a coordinated training mission under a single NATO framework will help focus Allied and partner contributions, allowing improvements to the international training effort.”²⁶ IJC “focuses on the full spectrum of COIN operations and stability operations in support of COMISAF’s campaign plan.”²⁷ Since IJC was a new operational headquarters, the staff

²⁴ Ibid., 11.

²⁵ Congressional Research Service, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, by the Congressional Research Service, December, 3, 2009, 10.

²⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: April 2010*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington DC: Department of Defense, April, 2010), 14.

²⁷ Ibid., 13.

structure would ensure coalition participation in a unified effort with the commander wearing a single command hat, but also be the deputy commander of U.S. Forces, Afghanistan (USFOR-A). The NTM-A commander would wear a dual-hat such that he commanded NTM-A and CSTC-A, thereby creating unity of command. “COMISAF recognized that the mission had evolved and that the command structure required reorganization to improve operational effectiveness.”²⁸ The new ISAF organizational structure resulted from environmental conditions requiring a revised COIN strategy, a change in political leadership, and the addition of resources that started in early 2008.

ISAF HQ was organized as a combined multiservice and multiagency command with deputy chiefs of staff functionally aligned along lines of efforts and operations. These currently include Reintegration, Corruption, Operations, Stability, Resources, Intelligence, Rule of Law, and Communication. COMISAF’s special staff includes the Commander’s Initiative Group (CIG), Legislative Affairs (LA), Public Affairs (PA), Legal, Commander’s Advisory & Assistance Team (CAAT), Political Advisor (POLAD), and several personal aides. Subordinate to COMISAF is a Deputy Commander, a Senior Enlisted Advisor, a Chief of Staff, the functional Staff, IJC, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force – Afghanistan (CJIATF-A), ISAF Special Operations Forces (ISAF SOF), NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission (NROLFSM), and NTM-A. COMISAF has four subordinate commanders and six special staff sections (a total of ten) that report directly to him. This is a reasonable span-of-control for one person to handle. However, as COMUSFOR-A, he has twenty-four entities reporting to him, which is considered cumbersome and inefficient. Dual-hatted, thirty-four personnel directly report to one commander.

²⁸ Ibid.

Both the U.S. (through President Obama) and NATO placed new emphasis on the role of government civilians in the COIN campaign. The role of United States Government (USG) agencies other than DOD was now increasing. In addition, NATO would parallel the U.S. efforts. The U.S. responded by sending Senior Civilian Representatives (SCR) to each Regional Command (RC) Headquarters to oversee the inter-agency efforts within their respective RC. The following explains the role of U.S. SCRs in Afghanistan:

Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) have been designated as counterparts to NATO-ISAF commanders in each of the Regional Commands. These SCRs are senior professionals experienced in conflict environments. They report directly to the [U.S.] Embassy's Interagency Sub-National Program Coordinator and through him to...the Coordinating Director of Development Assistance and Economic Affairs. The SCR positions are at the Minister Counselor level and they coordinate and direct the work of all U.S. Government civilians under Chief of Mission authority within their area of responsibility, and are responsive to [the ISAF SCR] overall guidance...[They] serve as the U.S. civilian counterpart to the military commander in the Regional Command, to senior international partner civilians, and to senior local Afghan Government officials. [They] provide foreign policy guidance and advice about the region to the military commander and, in turn, receive security advice from the commander to guide the execution of reconstruction and development activities.²⁹

NATO's 2008 strategic vision listed one of its guiding principles as "a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts."³⁰ In October 2003, NATO established the position of Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) to oversee international political and civilian organization efforts in Afghanistan. However, at that time, the SCR did not have ambassadorial rank. Without ambassador rank the SCR did not have the authority to execute plausible actions, but the civilian-military (civ-mil) relationship was born nonetheless. Subsequent to the strategy

²⁹ Ibid., 19-20.

³⁰ Ibid., 9.

and organizational changes made in 2009, NATO appointed a new civilian to be the SCR. It was not until January 2010, when Ambassador Sedwell took office, that someone with Ambassadorial rank possessed the position. NATO formed the SCR office to “improve the unity of effort between NATO and the United Nations Assistance Mission-Afghanistan (UNAMA), the European Union, and other international partners.”³¹ Although this position was created in 2003, the duties and responsibilities of the office were ill-defined until 2008. The new COIN strategy required more involvement in efforts from U.S. and international agencies, government and non-government alike, as well as more force commitments by the coalition nations. The SCR office became more relevant in its discharge of its duties and responsibilities by reshaping the SCR relationship with COMISAF. The SCR serves “as the top-ranking civilian of the NATO effort and the counterpart to COMISAF as the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR).”³² He “report[s] to [the] NATO Secretary General...under the political guidance of NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC).”³³ He “coordinates regularly with COMISAF and his staff to promote unity of effort in NATO’s military and political engagement in Afghanistan.”³⁴ In early 2010, in conjunction with its reorganization, ISAF restructured the SCR office into five directorates as shown below in Figure 6. The growth in SCR Staff and SCR responsibilities appears evolutionary as NATO realizes the effectiveness

³¹ Ibid., 12.

³² U.S. Department of Defense, *DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces* : April 2011, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington DC: Department of Defense, April, 2011), 9.

³³ U.S. Department of Defense, *DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*: November 2010, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington DC: Department of Defense, November, 2010), 16.

³⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*: October 2011, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington DC: Department of Defense, October, 2011), 9.

of its overall strategy in Afghanistan. The SCR will likely remain in Afghanistan past 2014 to continue its mission.




Figure 6. Office of the Senior Civilian Representative for NATO (ISAF HQ, 2010)³⁵

The NATO organization structure in Afghanistan is unique in that both COMISAF and the SCR are of equivalent ranks, albeit they have vastly different spans of control and authorities. However, when answering to the NATO Security Council, they must collaborate in order to ensure unity of effort toward the overall strategy. It is interesting that NATO has forced a political-military (POL-MIL) working relationship at the highest levels within Afghanistan. “Crucial to the revised NATO strategy is improvement in NATO and international civil-military coordination. To assist in the coordination and delivery of the NATO civilian effort in Afghanistan, on January 26, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen appointed former UK Ambassador to Afghanistan Mark Sedwill as the new NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) and as the civilian counterpart to [COMISAF].”³⁶ It is likely that COMISAF, or its

³⁵ This chart is the author’s illustration from personal experience serving on the ISAF HQ staff from April, 2011 until April, 2012.

³⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: April 2010, 12.

derivative, will eventually be subordinate to the SCR as ISAF realizes its military strategy in Afghanistan and the diplomatic efforts continue as the major emphasis area.

The takeaways from the ISAF discussion include reasons for reorganizing the commands and their staffs, span-of-control, existence of a non-J coded HQ staff, and the introduction of a SCR. The early-2009 change in strategy in Afghanistan resulted from a shift in political leadership, changes in resources and force availability, and differences in the environment. To execute the new strategy, ISAF reorganized its command structure and the ISAF HQ staff reorganized to support the commander. The parallel efforts of NATO and the U.S. were unified under one commander, but two HQ staffs remained for support. USFOR-A is organized using the J-coded functions, and ISAF uses the non-traditional functional construct better suited for establishing unity of effort in Afghanistan. Although the ISAF CDR's span-of-control is large and unwieldy, the HQ organization is still evolving to meet the CDR's needs and capabilities. The SCR office is the most dramatic change in a military effort, and is likely to influence all organizational constructs into the future. The ISAF CDR and SCR relationship also continue to evolve, and the lessons learned from their interaction must be captured to affect future civ-mil organizations.

CHAPTER 3

Tools for Change

Deciding when to make changes to an organization depends on several factors that senior management/leadership must continue to address. Leadership changes, the dynamic operating environment, and strategic shifts are the main variables that one must consider before changing the organization's structure. As leaders change, their staff's must change to accommodate their interests, abilities, and desires. The dynamic operating environment drives strategic realization and the organizational structure changes as it identifies new needs and challenges. The organization's strategy may remain constant at the highest echelon, but shifts at lower echelons as the ends, ways, means, and risks evolve. Organization redesign and job redesign are two areas with which to influence organizational change. Organization redesign involves the structure and processes, and job redesign involves the tasks and responsibilities. Changes in both areas will have to occur in the Geographic Combatant Command headquarters (GCCM HQ) to support Joint Force 2020 (JF 2020).

Organizational redesign "involves incremental adjustments or radical innovations focused on realigning departments, changing who makes decisions, and merging or reorganizing departments that sell the organization's products."¹ The two basic ways to accomplish this task are either to change the structure of the organization or change the processes within the organization. "Restructuring typically means reconfiguring the

¹ Don Hellriegel, Susan Jackson, and John Slocum, *Management, A Competency-Based Approach, 10 Ed.* (Canada: South-Western, 2005), 336.

distribution of authority, responsibility, and control in an organization.”² Reengineering “focuses on creating new ways to get work done.”³ In today’s highly technical world, most organizations change both structure and processes as they realize new requirements born from concluding activities and the emergence of new challenges.

Units must define staff duties and responsibilities to meet the goals, missions, and tasks of the organization as the strategy changes, the mission evolves, and the staff adjusts through job redesign. “Job redesign involves modifying specific employee job responsibilities and tasks.”⁴ CCDRs will need to be careful not to take current staff responsibilities and simply redistribute them among the remaining personnel. The flux in tasks and responsibilities will likely see more of a reliance on networking with outside agencies and organizations as well as divesting military responsibilities to the interagency organizations. Additionally, as staffs become smaller and requirements/responsibilities are redistributed, acceptance of greater risks will become the norm. Combatant Commands (CCMDs) will have to perform internal assessments of their staffs’ available workloads in order to complete a job redesign.

Units should continually assess organization and job redesign as changes occur in personnel, environment, and strategy. The strategic *means*, i.e. money and people, are likely the biggest influence on changing GCCM HQ structure and processes, but the adoption of new strategic *ends* and *ways* as well as acceptance of new *risks* are the reason for such change. However, the changing global environment also affects the staff. The GCCM must account for the many global efforts affecting its organization; therefore, accommodating the needs and requirements of each global effort requires alterations to

² Ibid., 336.

³ Ibid., 337.

⁴ Ibid., 337.

staff constructs and assignments. Due to its hybrid construct, dwindling resources, various mission sets, multiple agency participation, and the evolving global security environment, CCMD staffs must simultaneously restructure and reengineer their headquarters. The reduction in assigned personnel will force a structural change as the organization shuffles its offices and responsibilities. The USG interagency organizations are already present on GCCM HQ staffs, and their relevance will continue to evolve as their strengths are further integrated in U.S. global and regional efforts.

Changes in our defense strategy are driving the reorganization of the GCCM HQ staffs. Admiral James A. Winnefeld (Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), in a speech to the Atlantic Council in November 2012, provided the overarching national strategy as the:

That strategy lists four U.S. national interests: the security of the U.S., its citizens and U.S. allies and partners; a strong, innovative and growing U.S. economy and an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; respect for universal values at home and around the world; and finally, an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security and opportunity through stronger cooperation, to meet global challenges.⁵

From these national interests (*ends*), Admiral Winnefeld identified three changes in the military's operating environment that was the impetus behind the DSG. Summarizing, they are:

- 1) The existing QDR Strategy held true to a band of risks that were no longer applicable due to the impending budget cuts.⁶
- 2) "Both the changing and enduring security challenges that are out there in today's world, to include powerful peer – potential peer states; regional instability;...proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;...violent extremism;...the emergence of cyber;...transnational criminal

⁵ James A. Winnefeld, transcript from *Perspectives on National Security Challenges in the 21st Century*, Transcript by Federal News Service, Washington D.C. (November 27, 2012).

⁶ Ibid.

organizations;...disasters; competition for natural resources, and the like. So those enduring and changing geopolitical challenges were a big driver of that strategy.”⁷

3) “Changes in the ways wars are fought.” These include networked warfare that impact the pace of operations and speed of command, leverage gained from integration of intelligence and operations, and team work with our interagencies.⁸

The DSG is our nation’s new strategy based on these three changes in the operating environment. It is debatable whether the U.S. realized its previous strategies, but our time in Iraq has ended, and it appears our involvement in Afghanistan is reaching either its conclusion or a new chapter. Admiral Winnefeld stated our new strategy involving two major combat operations is to defeat one enemy while denying, or imposing costs, to another.⁹ This is a strategic shift from the *defeat two enemies* strategy that lasted for many years. Further, Admiral Winnefeld stated:

We put more emphasis on the Pacific while retaining emphasis on the very important region we call the Middle East; more emphasis on cyber; being able to project power; anti-access environments; greater emphasis on efficiency in the department...; [and] less emphasis on long-term stability operations.... maintaining our counterterrorism capability, obviously, a nuclear deterrent, although we believe we can do that with a slightly smaller force; certainly maintaining our ability to do defense support of civil authorities and our great partnership with our Guard – National Guard and state partners there; determination to avoid a hollow force; and then recognizing that we might not get it right, and that we needed to build in reversibility both on the industrial base and in our people, and applicability to the reserve component as well, to make sure we accounted for that.¹⁰

The GCCMs must reorganize to meet the new budget and security challenges that exist today, and to meet the ten missions listed in the DSG, the Chairman’s Strategic Guidance, and the CCJO. National leadership updated the national and defense strategies

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ James A. Winnefeld, transcript from *Perspectives on National Security Challenges in the 21st Century*, Transcript by Federal News Service, Washington D.C. (November 27, 2012).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

with each CCMD reflecting those changes in their strategic posture, priorities, and principles to be discussed in Chapter Four.

Our strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan have evolved; therefore, restructuring across DOD services will occur as DOD disestablishes commands and redistributes personnel. Although our national security strategy remains unchanged, the new defense strategy provides new *ways* to meet our strategic *ends* in the form of ten new missions. The changing security environment continues to change our *risks* associated with strategic choices. The current budget cuts impact the resources, i.e. the *means*, our military uses to execute its assigned missions and responsibilities. As these cuts to our resources become apparent, the COCOMs will determine their priorities and acceptable risks. The DSG provided the ends and ways, but the means and risks are still unfolding. Adapting to meet the intent of the ten new mission sets will define the new GCCM HQ construct. Knowing these truths, GCCM HQ must change using organizational and job redesign measures, but must remain flexible to the evolving resource and risk changes with relation to conducting these new mission sets. DOD must change the GCCM organizational structure to meet the strategic needs of JF 2020.

CHAPTER 4

Geographic Combatant Command Headquarters (GCCM HQ)

“The opposite is beneficial; from things that differ comes the fairest attunement; all things are born through strife.”

-- Heraclitus, From *On the Universe* [46]¹

The GCCM HQ structure, defined by Joint Publication 1 (JP-1) guidance, authorizes the Combatant Commander (CCDR) to organize his staff “as deemed necessary to accomplish assigned missions.”² Several factors influence the CCDR’s discretion including, but is not limited to, assigned duties and responsibilities, mission and task sets, the operating environment, and the CCMD strategy. As discussed previously in Chapter One, JP-1 provides a starting framework for all joint commands to follow but allows each commander to adjust the structure as necessary. The analysis that follows focuses on the GCCM mission statements, strategies, and HQ staff positions for each of the GCCMs.

Each GCCM has a mission statement with associated strategic priorities used to guide the command’s efforts. Linking the mission and strategy to the GCCM HQ construct is difficult, but the following discussion provides current GCCM mission statements, strategic priorities, and staff nuances. Currently, all of the CCMDs use the JP-1 framework to organize their staffs, and all have Deputy Commanders (DCOM) and a Senior Enlisted Leader (SEL) reports directly to the CCDR. The personal staff group of the Commander “usually includes a staff judge advocate, political advisor, public affairs officer, inspector general, provost marshal, chaplain, surgeon, historian, and others as

¹ John Bartlett, *Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations*, ed. Justin Kaplan (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 64.

² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 7, 2007, Incorporating Change 1, March 20, 2009), V-13.

directed....The special staff group consists of representatives of technical or administrative services and can include representatives from government or nongovernmental agencies....this group should be small to avoid unnecessary duplication of corresponding staff sections or divisions within the Service component headquarters.”³ The Office of the Chief of Staff (COS) normally includes the Comptroller, the Secretariat, the Historian, Protocol, and the Commandant.

USAFRICOM (reference Appendix E for Organization Chart)

USAFRICOM’s mission statement:

Africa Command protects and defends the national security interests of the US by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.⁴

USAFRICOM’s efforts are centered on four strategic cornerstones: “Deter and defeat transnational threats; prevent future conflicts; support humanitarian and disaster relief; and protect U.S. security interests.”⁵ The two principles to their strategy include “a safe, secure, and stable Africa is in our national interests, and Africans are best suited to address African security challenges.”⁶ USAFRICOM is focused on security cooperation activities through building partner capacities. Much of this command’s organization is focused on interagency efforts and assisting other commands and organizations with global efforts like countering transnational criminal organizations, countering

³ Ibid., V-15.

⁴ United States Africa Command, <http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command> (accessed 3 April 2013)

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Statement of General Carter F. Ham, USA, Commander United States Africa Command Before the House Armed Services Committee on February 29, 2012.

proliferation of WMD, and combating terrorism. The GCCM HQ structure includes staffs and directorates to support their strategy, mission, and on-going operations.

The USAFRICOM Commander organized his staff into six special staff sections, seven staff directorates, and one additional directorate for liaison officers and USG agency representatives. The special staff group consists of the Inspector General (IG), legal counsel, command surgeon, the commander's action group (CAG), a foreign policy advisor (POLAD), and a USAID Development Advisor (six reporting entities). There is one military deputy commander and one civilian deputy commander. Since there is a civilian deputy, USAFRICOM has a shared services branch that handles both military and civilian administrative efforts. The seven J-coded directorates also have Directors' titles that lend specificity to their function. For example, the Director for Resources is also known as the combined J1/J8 coded staff. The J-7, Director for Joint Training, Readiness, & Exercise, is an added directorate not listed in JP-1. The other added directorate, J-9, is known as the Director for Outreach. It includes the interagency elements and is an attempt at organizing the other agency's efforts within the whole-of-government approach.⁷ The J-3, Director for Operations, contains the J-3 Fusion Center. All of the staff directorates are organized functionally except for the J-5 which is a matrix organization due to its mix of functional and geographic divisions. According to the most recently published organization chart, USAFRICOM's Commander has eighteen entities reporting to him, which may be excessive. Also, there are three levels of

⁷ Interagencies currently involved in USAFRICOM's efforts include three from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Homeland Security Investigation, and the U.S. Coast Guard), two from the Department of Justice (DOJ: Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)), the Department of the Interior (U.S. Geological Survey), the Department of State (Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)), and the Department of Agriculture.

hierarchy between the CCDR and the sub-directorates, which is considered streamlined and effective.

USCENTCOM (reference Appendix E for Organization Chart)

USCENTCOM's mission is:

With national and international partners, U.S. Central Command promotes cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and non-state aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity.”⁸

USCENTCOM established five strategic objectives with which to focus their efforts in the AOR:

- 1) We will promote common interests in order to enhance stability and security
- 2) We will defeat violent extremist organizations (VEOs) that threaten the U.S. homeland, our overseas interests, or U.S. allies
- 3) We will Counter the proliferation, acquisition, and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- 4) We will support Department of State's broader diplomatic objectives by assisting in setting the conditions that will enable representative government and prosperity
- 5) We will prepare U.S. and partner forces to respond to emerging challenges⁹

USCENTCOM is focused on protecting U.S. national interests, ongoing operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East, security cooperation activities that promote stability and security, and supporting DOS objectives. Much of this command's organization is focused on military operations, and is mostly the supported command by other CCMDs. USCENTCOM's HQ structure includes staffs and directorates to support their strategy, mission, and on-going operations.

⁸ United States Central Command, <http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/our-mission/> (accessed 3 April 2013).

⁹ Statement of U.S. Marine Corps General James N. Mattis, U.S. Central Command Commander, before the House Armed Services Committee on March 7, 2012, about the posture of U.S. Central Command.

The USCENTCOM Commander organized his staff into nine special staff sections, eight staff directorates that report to the Chief of Staff (CoS), a Deputy Chief of Staff, and two offices that report to the CoS. The special staff group consists of the Chaplain, Surgeon, IG, Judge Advocate, Public Affairs, Special Operations, Political Advisor, an Other Advisors section, and the Commander's Advisory Group (nine reporting entities). The CDR has only one deputy commander and a Senior Enlisted Leader (SEL). The COS is subordinate to the Deputy Commander and does not report directly to the Commander. According to the most recently published organization chart, USCENTCOM's CDR has eleven entities reporting to him, which is considered manageable. There are five levels of hierarchy between the CCDR and the sub-directorates, which is considered cumbersome, and may not comply with JP-1 guidance regarding due consideration of all staff members' recommendations.

USEUCOM (reference Appendix E for Organization Chart)

USEUCOM's mission is "to conduct military operations, international military engagement, and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the United States forward."¹⁰ The six theater priorities include:

1. Ensure readiness to execute European Command's NATO Article 5 commitment and other contingency plans.
2. Preserve our strategic partnerships.
 - a. Sustain relationship with our allies to ensure a strong NATO Alliance;
 - b. Preserve recently developed allied and partner capability and interoperability;
 - c. Maintain regional stability and security.
3. Enable ISAF's transition to Afghan security lead.
4. Counter transnational threats, focusing on: missile defense; weapons of mass destruction; counter-terrorism; illicit trafficking; counter-piracy; and cyberspace.
5. Maintain U.S. strategic access across Europe in support of global operations.

¹⁰ United States European Command, <http://www.eucom.mil/mission> (accessed 3 April 2013).

6. Maintain particular focus on four key countries: Israel, Poland, Russia, and Turkey.¹¹

USEUCOM's mission and strategy are directly linked to the Defense Strategic Guidance more so than the other GCCMs. Their posture statement provides justification for the command's efforts and activities and links them to the DSG. USEUCOM is focused on "combined operations, theater exercises, interagency outreach, and security cooperation."¹² Much of this command's organization is focused on military operations in Afghanistan (ISAF) and security cooperation activities. The GCCM HQ structure includes staffs and directorates to support their strategy, mission, and on-going operations. The GCCM HQ construct is the closest to what all the GCCMs should strive.

The USEUCOM Commander organized his staff into seven special staff sections, eight staff directorates, and an additional ten staff sections that report to the COS (18 reporting entities). The special staff group consists of the IG, Judge Advocate, Special Assistants, Strategic Affairs Group, Congressional Affairs, Washington Liaison Office, and Special Operations Director (seven reporting entities). There is one military and one civilian deputy commander. The J-5 and J-8 directorates are combined, and there are two additional directorates, the J-7 and J-9. The Command Surgeon and Command Chaplain both report to the COS. According to the most recently published organization chart, USEUCOM's CDR has ten entities reporting to him, which is considered manageable. There are five levels of hierarchy between the CDR and the sub-directorates, which is considered cumbersome, and may not comply with JP-1 guidance regarding due consideration of all staff members' recommendations.

¹¹ United States European Command, "Mission, Vision, Objectives, Priorities," <http://www.eucom.mil/mission> (accessed 20 January 2013).

¹² United States European Command, *2013 Posture Statement* (Europe, 2013).

USNORTHCOM (reference Appendix E for Organization Chart)

USNORTHCOM's mission is to "partner to conduct Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests."¹³ The five strategic priorities of the commander include:

1. Expand and strengthen our trusted partnerships.
2. Advance and sustain the binational military command.
3. Gain and maintain all-domain situational awareness.
4. Advocate and develop capabilities in our core mission areas to outpace threats.
5. Take care of people; they are our foundation.¹⁴

USNORTHCOM's mission and strategy are focused on relationship building with key partners and on rigorous training to ensure unity of effort and timely reaction to crises events. Much of this command's organization is focused on "homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), and security cooperation"¹⁵ activities. The GCCM HQ structure includes staffs and directorates to support their strategy and mission.

The CDR for USNORTHCOM has six special staff sections, a personal security detail, three NORAD reporting regions, four advisors, and an additional thirteen staff sections that report to the COS (18 reporting entities). The special staff group consists of the Commander's Initiative Group (CIG), IG, Judge Advocate, Legislative Affairs, Surgeon General, and the Command Chaplain. There is one deputy commander. The COS has a special staff section that includes the Command Protocol, Historian,

¹³ United States Northern Command, http://www.northcom.mil/About/history_education/vision.html (accessed 3 April 2013).

¹⁴ Statement of General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., United States Army Commander United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 13, 2012.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Washington Office, and Public Affairs. Also under the COS are the J-1 through J-8 staff directorates plus a Knowledge Management section, Command Support element, a Science & Technology Directorate, and an Interagency Coordination Directorate. According to the most recently published organization chart, USNORTHCOM's CDR has fifteen entities reporting to him, which may be overwhelming and inefficient. There are three levels of hierarchy between the CDR and the sub-directorates, which is considered streamlined and effective.

USPACOM (reference Appendix E for Organization Chart)

Although not specifically stated as USPACOM's mission, the following is deduced as such:

USPACOM protects and defends the United States, its territories, and interests; promotes regional security; deters aggression; and is prepared to respond if deterrence efforts fail. Through strong relationships with allies and partners, assured presence facilitated by balanced, and distributed force posture, and effective strategic communication effort that clearly and accurately conveys our intent and resolve, USPACOM, in concert with other U.S. government agencies, will ensure U.S. national interest are protected and the Asia-Pacific region is stable and secure.¹⁶

Further, the USPACOM strategy states:

In accordance with national guidance, our desired end state is that the Asia-Pacific is secure and prosperous, underpinned by U.S. leadership and the rules-based international order. To this end, we will strengthen alliances and partnerships, maintain an assured presence in the region, and effectively communicate our intent and resolve to safeguard U.S. national interests. As we work closely with partners across the U.S. government and in the region to address shared challenges and prevent conflict, we will ensure we are ready to respond rapidly and effectively across the full range of military operations. United States Pacific Command is committed to be agile, flexible, and ready to meet the challenges of an uncertain and dynamic security environment.¹⁷

¹⁶ United States Pacific Command, <http://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/2013-uspacom-strategy.shtml>, (accessed 3 April 2013).

¹⁷ Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, United States Navy United States Pacific Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 12, 2012 about the U.S. Pacific Command Posture.

USPACOM's mission and strategy are focused on rebalancing efforts and activities to their AOR. USPACOM focuses much of its organization on relationship building with key allies and partners and rigorous training to ensure unity of effort and timely reaction to crises events. USPACOM HQ structure includes staffs and directorates to support their strategy and mission.

According to the most recent PACOM Organization Chart, the CCDR has twelve special staff sections, a Deputy Commander, a COS, five special directorates, and nine J-coded staff directorates traditionally aligned under the COS. The special staff sections include: the IG, Judge Advocate, Commander's Action Group (CAG), Public Affairs, Political Advisor (POLAD), Mobilization Assistant to the Commander, the SEL, Protocol, Command History, Comptroller, Command Surgeon, Headquarters Commandant. The five special directorates include: the Strategic Synchronization Board Director (SSB); China Strategic Focus Group Director (China SFG); India Strategic Focus Group Director (India SFG); Democratic People's Republic of Korea Strategic Focus Group Director (DPRK SFG); and the Allies and Partners Strategic Focus Group Director (A&P SFG). There is one military deputy commander. The J-7 is the Training and Exercises Directorate; the J-8 is the Resources and Assessments Directorate; and the J-9 is the Pacific Outreach Directorate. There is no Command Chaplain reflected within the organization chart. The current organization chart is large and unwieldy which complicates visual understanding of staff relationships. That said, the CDRUSPACOM appears to have nineteen entities reporting to him, which may be overwhelming and inefficient. Also, there are four levels of hierarchy between the CCDR and the sub-

directorates, which is considered manageable, but considering the competition for CDR attention within his immediate staff, four levels is cumbersome.

USSOUTHCOM (reference Appendix E for Organization Chart)

USSOUTHCOM's mission is to "conduct joint and combined full-spectrum military operations and support whole-of-government efforts to enhance regional security and cooperation."¹⁸ The six strategic focus areas include: 1) Countering transnational organized crime; 2) Humanitarian assistance/Disaster relief; 3) Support to peacekeeping operations; 4) Training and exercise; 5) Multinational engagement; and 6) Human rights.¹⁹ "USSOUTHCOM's efforts are focused upon three strategic objectives: to defend the United States and its interests, foster regional security, and serve as an enduring partner of choice in support of a peaceful and prosperous region."²⁰ USSOUTHCOM's mission and strategy are focused on on-going operations and security cooperation activities that build partner capacity. Much of this command's organization is focused on relationship building with key allies and partners and rigorous training to ensure unity of effort and timely reaction to crises events. The GCCM HQ structure includes staffs and directorates to support their strategy and mission.

The CDR for USSOUTHCOM has six special staff sections, eight staff directorates, and an additional ten staff sections that report to the COS (18 reporting entities). The special staff group consists of the command SEL, CAG, IG, Command Chaplain, Judge Advocate, Mobilization Assistant to the CDR, and the Business Engagement Advisor (BEA). The BEA is unique to this GCCM. There are two deputy

¹⁸ United States Southern Command, <http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Our-Missions.aspx> (accessed 3 April 2013).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ United States Southern Command, *Command Strategy 2020, Partnership for the Americas* (Miami, FL, 2010).

commanders, one military and one civilian, and the civilian deputy also serves as the CDR's political advisor (POLAD). The COS has eight offices reporting to him in addition to the staff directorates. There is an Assistant COS Strategic Communication; a Deputy COS; Public Affairs, the Secretary of the Joint Staff; Executive Services; the Washington Field Office; Congressional Affairs; and the Knowledge Management office. The Command Surgeon reports to the COS. There are three additional directorates, the J-7, J-8, and J-9. According to the most recently published organization chart, USSOUTHCOM's CDR has ten entities reporting to him, which is considered manageable. Also, there are three levels of hierarchy between the CDR and the sub-directorates, which is considered streamlined and effective.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Recommendations

“Tiny differences in input could quickly become overwhelming differences in output....In weather, for example, this translates into what is only half-jokingly known as the Butterfly Effect-the notion that a butterfly stirring the air today in Peking can transform storm systems next month in New York.”

-- James Gleick, From *Chaos, Prologue* [1987]¹

The following recommendations focus on organizational vertical design that provides flexibility, the vital involvement of the inter-agencies and partner militaries in Geographic Combatant Command headquarters (GCCM HQ) staff efforts, and a foundation for a standardized construct that allows for synchronization of global efforts.

Recommendation #1 (reference Figure 10)

The author recommends that each GCCM organize its HQ using a hybrid construct to include two chains of command under the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC), with one being military and one being civilian. In addition, it should include a single Senior Enlisted Leader (SEL) position. Therefore the GCCM should have two deputy commanders (DCOM); one military and one civilian appointee. The military deputy will focus on the military activities and assist the commander as required. The civilian deputy, holding ambassadorial rank, will oversee all of the interagency efforts common to the GCCM, and serve as the GCC's political advisor (POLAD). Knowing multiple players exist across overlapping regional lines and interests, the coordination requires someone with appointee authority. USAFRICOM, USEUCOM and USSOUTHCOM already have this construct in place.

¹ John Bartlett, *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations*, ed. Justin Kaplan (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 842.

Currently, all GCCM HQ use the J-9 directorate as their interagency collection point. In some cases, the GCCM established task forces like Joint Interagency Task Force – South (JIATF-S) and coordinating groups like a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) to provide areas to integrate and coordinate both military and civilian efforts. This is part of the evolution of interagency participation at the Combatant Command (COCOM) level. Establishing a parallel civ-mil chain of command in each GCCM HQ will provide better partnering opportunities and flexibility between peacetime and crisis action periods. GCCMs should establish separate, but parallel, civilian divisions on the HQ staff. The military staff handles the military affairs, and the civilian staff handles the interagency affairs. The interagency divisions should include senior civilians assigned to them who have decision-making authorities, and report to the Civilian DCOM and/or the COS. This ensures efficient coordination between the military and civilian agencies without the lost time of working with other agency liaisons. Unity of effort is realized through process interaction in the existing “fusion centers” or proposed Operations and Planning Integration Centers.

Eventually, there should also be two chiefs of staff (COS), one for the military side and one for the civilian side. Each report to their respective deputy commander; however, in the near term, one COS will suffice. Immediately, each GCCM should establish a deputy COS position to handle the command’s administrative tasks so the COS can focus on all matters that pertain to the directorates and interim working groups. The COS’s span-of-control must be flat and not exceed his capabilities. The deputy COS position alleviates the direct administrative trivia allowing the COS more time to devote

to steering the directorates per GCC guidance; and it provides greater access for the directors to interface with the COS.

Partner militaries and regional/indigenous organizations nest into this construct where their duties and responsibilities best align. For example, foreign diplomats, dignitaries, and government representatives most likely will work/contribute in the civilian chain of command; however, their inputs and ideas will influence both military and civilian efforts in the command. Military members from partner nations will continue to work alongside their U.S. military counterparts, but will also benefit from the multiple agency inputs working in the GCCM HQ. As partnering efforts continue, foreign nations will begin to assign military and civilian representatives to the GCCM HQ. Establishing two chains of command now provides the required framework for absorbing these personnel into the staff.

Establishing a civilian chain of command provides in-house supervisory authority. Currently, LNOs and agency representatives most likely report to a supervisor not located at the GCCM HQ. Inherently, the decision-making and information sharing loops become quicker if the GCC reduces the number of geographically separated supervisors is reduced. Reduce the number of LNOs by replacing them with assigned personnel whose rater, or direct supervisor, is near and present. Remaining LNOs should be re-assigned out of the J-9 directorate and into one that is more in line with using their abilities and knowledge. Reorganizing provides that construct thereby increasing efficiency and oversight of tasks and duties.

Standardizing this construct will provide greater synchronization of common efforts between DOD and DOS regions. Global integration and agility among

interagency and military services is better served through a parallel chain of command at each GCCM HQ as it will unify efforts through organized constructs and interlinked processes.

Recommendation #2

Reduce the personal staff group by eliminating redundancies within the staff directorates and by eliminating all special staff groups. Place the historian, Surgeon General (SG), Chaplain (CH), Public Affairs (PA), and Legal staffs (SJA) within the staff directorates. Limit the special staff to the commander's aides, speech-writers, Inspector General, and newly formed Liaison Bureau. A Director of Staff (DS), who is independent of the DCOM and COS chain of command, will coordinate the Commander's personal staff. Moving these groups back into the directorates will indirectly provide commander's direction throughout the staff, and keep the directors abreast of the commander's current interests and battle rhythm. The DS and COS coordinate control of the synergy of efforts.

The SG, CH, and SJA groups should expand their focus and responsibilities to include not only the internal GCCM factors, but also to the external environment within the AOR. The Surgeon General would track health related issues across the AOR that effect the GCCM strategy, and build partnerships with foreign militaries and medical organizations that provide humanitarian assistance. Likewise, the Command Chaplain could expand efforts with partner militaries and religious organizations to bring awareness of regional tensions and opportunities. The Staff Judge Advocate could expand into foreign rule of law partnering to bring awareness of capabilities, tensions, and opportunities to the GCCM HQ for planning and understanding. Awareness of

tensions and opportunities in these areas provides GCCMs with early regional indications and warnings that otherwise might go unnoticed. Being prepared for the next crisis is likely dependent on health, religious, and/or rule of law issues, and not just military force. Expanding the roles and responsibilities of the SG, CH, and SJA ensures global agility is achieved through standardized constructs across the GCCMs. Partnering efforts in these areas will expand the U.S. depth of influence and provide intelligence on partner capacities in health, religious, and rule of law issues. The Commander realizes flexibility through the indications and warnings born from health, religious, and rule of law issues that influence GCCM operations and planning.

Other changes include establishing a Liaison Bureau (LB) that is responsible for all matters requiring coordination with U.S. and Foreign senior diplomats, dignitaries, and military officers whom the GCC is working or meeting. The protocol office within the DCOS staff would be linked to this office for administrative purposes only. The LB will exchange information at the senior level for the GCC to use and distribute, but use the HQ staff to research and produce products required for these senior leader negotiations. This is much different than the current Commander's Action Groups (CAGs)/Commander's Initiative Groups (CIGs) who do their own research and produce their own products with staffs of ten or more. CAGs/CIGs are known to harbor their information; thus, the directorate staff has little to no knowledge of what the GCC is engaged or interested in at the senior level. BL: Eliminate the CAG/CIG!

Recommendation #3

The third recommendation is to standardize the directorates to include J-1 through J-6 plus the SG, CH, and SJA, and provide a name for each directorate that is common to

all GCCMS (Reference Figure 10 for suggested directorate names). Name each directorate to identify peacetime realities while remaining flexible for crisis response and ongoing military operations. Eliminate the J-7 directorate and place all training, readiness, and exercise personnel in the J-3 and J-5 depending on their focus. Place the Resource staff in the J-1, and Assessment staff in the J-5. The added bureaucracy of separate J-7 and J-8 directorates is unnecessary and inefficient. Standardizing the staffs along the J-codes and similar names ensures cross service and cross-command parity. This, in turn, allows synchronization of efforts to occur that support the global campaign plans. Standardized language, acronyms, and directorate activities are fundamental to synchronizing efforts across services, commands, and agencies. Synchronization allows for timely reaction and flexible response through shared processes and familiar constructs between organizations.

Recommendation #4

The fourth recommendation is to flatten the GCCM HQ by broadening responsibilities that maximize span-of-control and reduce hierarchical depth to ensure efficiencies without exceeding the key staffs' abilities. Further, the GCCM HQ staff should investigate authorities and responsibilities of each staff position for redundancies, clarity, and cohesiveness. In addition, the commands need to ensure the GCC's span-of-control is kept to a minimum. The commander will likely decide what he is capable of handling, but his staff must ensure mission creep does not encroach upon what is most efficient for him. The Director of Staff is likely the one regulating the number of personnel directly influencing the commander. The commands must strive to achieve three or four levels of vertical depth between the CDR and subordinates within the

directorates, and accept no more than five. Minimizing the number of levels in an organization ensures workers have enough work to keep them gainfully employed. Supervisors and directors alike will benefit from the close relationships within the organization, and communication should be open and free flowing. The staff size should be small but efficient with ideas being easily exchanged across staff groups and between echelons.

Recommendation #5

The commands must investigate internal staff processes before and after reorganization for efficiencies. Every GCCM headquarters should regularly evaluate its staff organization and processes to ensure efficiencies are used, realized, and implemented. Scheduling an outside agency or firm to evaluate the headquarters on such matters is money and time well spent. It is the author's opinion, based on experience, that the best time to conduct such evaluations is six months after a new commander takes office, and two years later. The six-month time frame allows sufficient time for the new commander to make personal adjustments to the staff and processes. The independent study would verify his changes, and likely make a few recommendations to ensure efficiencies are being captured. After another two years, the staff has rotated, the commander is comfortable in his seat, and processes and functions are likely mature. This is an optimum time for an independent study to analyze the processes within the headquarters.

The recommendations focus on organizational vertical design that provides flexibility, the vital involvement of the inter-agencies and partner militaries in Geographic Combatant Command headquarters (GCCM HQ) staff efforts, and a

foundation for a standardized construct that allows for synchronization of global efforts. Applying these recommendations is only the beginning to reorganizing the headquarters staff. Directors and supervisors will have to determine the organizational construct below the directorate echelon, but establishing the upper structure is first. The interagency involvement will mature and expand as the GCC fills positions and determines responsibilities. GCCM HQ staff must ensure their span of control and hierarchies are appropriate for personal abilities and desires.

Conclusion

“One can describe the world of today to the people of today only if one describes it as capable of alteration.”

-- Bertolt Brecht, From *Can Today's World Become Restored Through Theater?* [1955]¹

Since the release of the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and the Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force (CSDJF), the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCMs) have updated their missions and theater strategies. Additionally, the fiscal reductions in manpower and resources will necessitate GCCM strategy changes that will likely add accepted risks to current theater campaign and subordinate plans. USEUCOM implemented a reorganization of their HQ in the summer and fall of 2012 due to manpower reductions already imposed on them, but it will likely continue to evolve as the realities of the resource constraints become apparent. Similarly, the other GCCMs will have to do the same, and the decision to make drastic or incremental changes to the HQs will not be easy. To meet the needs of Joint Force 2020, GCCs will have to adjust due to reductions in manpower, new missions sets, dwindling resources, and the need to work across agencies. Changes to all of the GCCM HQs' organizational structure will necessarily occur as they revise their strategies. Form should follow function, thus structure follows strategy. Risks along with reliance on multi-lateral cooperation with other nations will both increase, and interaction with other USG agencies will become the norm. It will be a hybrid structure that uses functional, divisional, network, matrix, and other unique organizing dynamics to meet strategic goals within their respective Area of Responsibility (AOR).

¹ John Bartlett, *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations*, ed. Justin Kaplan (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 751.

The whole of government approach is still evolving both conceptually and organizationally relative to U.S. Government global efforts. Current GCCM HQ constructs provide for interagency participation in the workings of the staff, but no standardized organization structure or guidance exists across the GCCMs. All of the GCCM's recognize inter-agency participation, and most provide for a separate directorate to oversee their activities. This is a natural evolution in the growing whole-of-government approach. The GCCMs should reorganize based on the recommendations to meet the strategic challenges now and into the future. Establishing a new structural standardization will enhance the evolutionary involvement of USG agencies in each region.

By adopting the recommended changes, the GCCMs will take a step forward in meeting the direction afforded them in the DSG, CSDJF, and the CCJO. Efficiencies in the HQ will be found and implemented as directed by the DSG. The organizational structure will provide a means to "better leverage game-changing capabilities" per the CSDJF. The parallel civilian chain of command established within each HQ meets the intent of the CSDJF to "expand the envelope of interagency and international cooperation [and] promote multilateral security approaches and architectures."² Further, the recommended construct provides for global agility, partnering, and flexibility identified in the CCJO through the structures that can easily morph to meet both peacetime and crises activities. The more organized involvement of the USG and international agencies, and the standardization of key staff positions will create synergies for U.S. global efforts.

² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force* (Washington, DC: February 6, 2012), 5.

Using the tools for change discussed in Chapter Three coupled with the lessons learned from GE and ISAF in Chapter Two, GCCM HQ staffs will successfully reorganize. Focusing on the span-of-control of key players on the staffs, and the hierarchies involved, the flattening of the GCCM HQ will achieve acceptable efficiencies in staff processes, relationships, and coordination. Understanding that organizational changes occur based on leadership inputs, environmental impacts, and strategic realization, GE's example illustrates how a large organization can successfully reorganize incrementally. The current ISAF HQ demonstrates how parallel military and civilian chains of command work together to achieve multinational strategies in a conflict zone. Both GE and ISAF provide working constructs that the GCCMs should use when reorganizing their HQ staffs.

The recommendations provide three ways through five recommendations to meet the requirements of recently released national security guidance documents. The recommended construct is flexible in peace and in crisis. It is heavily reliant on a more robust interagency and partner military presence with greater authorities and deeper inclusion into GCCM efforts. Finally, the GCCMs will achieve greater synchronization regarding global campaigns/efforts by standardizing key positions on the staff.

APPENDIX A

Abbreviations & Acronyms

ANA	Afghan National Army
ANSF	Afghan National Security Force
AOR	Area of Responsibility
BDE	Brigade
BEA	Business Engagement Advisor
C2	Command and Control
CAG	Commander's Action Group
CAAT	COMISAF Advisory & Assistance Team
CCDR	Combatant Commander (position)
CCJO	Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
CCMD	Combatant Command (area/function)
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CEX	Chief Executive Officer (old)
CFC-A	Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan
CFO	Chief Financial Officer
CJIATF-A	Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Afghanistan
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIG	Commander's Initiative Group
CIV-MIL	Civilian-Military
CMOTF	Civil Military Operations Task Force
COA	Course of Action
COCOM	Combatant Command (authority/construct)
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COMISAF	Commander ISAF
COS	Chief of Staff
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DCOM	Deputy Commander
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DSG	Defense Strategic Guidance
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCCM	Functional Combatant Command
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
G-N	Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
GCC	Geographic Combatant Commander
GCCM	Geographic Combatant Command
GCCM HQ	Geographic Combatant Command Headquarters
GE	General Electric Company

HQ	Headquarters
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IE	Intelligence Enterprise
IG	Inspector General
INGO	International Non-Government Organization
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JA	Judge Advocate
JDA	Joint Duty Assignment
JF	Joint Force
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force
JIATF-S	Joint Interagency Task Force-South
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTF-N	Joint Task Force-North
JTF-W	Joint Task Force-West
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
LA	Legal Advisor or Legislative Affairs
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC-U	National Broadcasting Company - Universal
NCA	National Command Authority
NDU	National Defense University
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMS	National Military Strategy
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NRF	National Response Framework
NROLFSM	NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission
NSS	National Security Strategy
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OPORDS	Operations Orders
OPT	Operational Planning Team
PA	Public Affairs
POLAD	Political Advisor
POL-MIL	Political-Military
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RC	Regional Command
R&D	Research & Development
SBU	Strategic Business Unit
SCR	Senior Civilian Representative
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SEL	Senior Enlisted Leader
SES	Senior Executive Service
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SOF	Special Operations Forces

SPG	Strategic Planning Group
TCP	Theater Campaign Plan
TF	Task Force
UCP	Unified Command Plan
U.K.	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan
U.S.	United States
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USFOR-A	United States Forces – Afghanistan
USG	United States Government
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
WG	Wing
WOG	Whole-of-Government
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two

APPENDIX B

General Electric Organization Charts




Chart 1: GE Company Organization Chart – March, 2008¹

¹ GE Company Organization Chart, March 2008, <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/19702317/GE-Company-Organization-Chart> (accessed January 21, 2013).




Chart 2: GE Company Organization Chart – July, 2008²

² GE Company Organization Chart, July 2008, http://www.deepgreencrystals.com/2159664_1217006578_ge_organization_chart.pdf (accessed January 21, 2013).



imagination at work

GE Company Organization Chart

LAST UPDATE MARCH 2010




Chart 3: GE Company Organization Chart – March, 2010³

³ GE Company Organization Chart – PDF, March 2010, <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/32060776/imagination-at-work-GE-Company-Organization-Chart---PDF> (accessed January 21, 2013).

GE Company Organization Chart

Updated February 2011




Chart 4: GE Company Organization Chart – February, 2011⁴

⁴ GE Company Organization Structure, February 2011, <http://turesuperstar.wikispaces.com/GE+Company+organization+structure> (accessed January 21, 2013).

GE Company Organization Chart

UPDATED OCTOBER 2012




Chart 5: GE Company Organization Chart – October, 2012⁵

⁵ GE Company Organization Chart, Oct 2012, http://www.ge.com/pdf/company/ge_organization_chart.pdf (accessed January 21, 2013).

APPENDIX C

ISAF Organization Charts





Chart 1. ISAF Command Structure (2008).¹

¹ Hope, Ian. *Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War*, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=889> (accessed January 31, 2013), 11.



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Chart 2. ISAF Command Structure (April 2010).²

² DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: (April, 2010), 15.




Chart 4. ISAF Command Structure (March 2011).⁴

⁴ DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: (April, 2011), 8.





Chart 5. ISAF Command Structure (September 30, 2011)⁵

⁵ DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: (October, 2011), 8.



* - Listed in legend


Chart 6. ISAF Command Structure (December, 2012)⁶

⁶ DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: (December, 2012), 13.


APPENDIX D

Geographic Combatant Command Headquarter Organization Charts


U.S. AFRICA COMMAND




U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND




U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND




U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND



U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND



U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND



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VITA

Colonel Rhude “Buster” Cherry, United States Air Force, is an F-16 fighter pilot and most recently served as the Operations Officer for the Commander’s Advisory and Assistance Team, International Security Assistance Force Headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan. He was prior enlisted in the South Carolina Air National Guard, Eastover, South Carolina, where he was assigned to the base fire department. After graduating from The Citadel, he was selected as an officer candidate. He received a Reserve Commission from the Academy of Military Science (National Guard), but later accepted a Regular Commission into the active duty in 2002. He received his pilot wings from Laughlin AFB, Texas, in February, 1992, and then graduated from Lead-In Fighter Training (LIFT) and F-16 RTU that same year. He spent 5 years with the South Carolina Air National Guard as a fighter pilot, and then accepted orders as a T-38 Instructor Pilot at Columbus AFB, Mississippi. From Columbus he went to Misawa, Japan, to fly the F-16, Block 50 aircraft. His next assignment was at Langley AFB, VA, as an F-16 Operations Inspector for Air Combat Command. Colonel Cherry then went to Kunsan AB, ROK, to be the wing exercise and plans director. He then commanded the 548th Combat Training Squadron at Fort Polk, Louisiana, from 2008 to 2010. In 2010 he applied for and was accepted into the AFPAK Hands program and deployed to Afghanistan from April, 2011, until April, 2012. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer’s School (residence), Air Command & Staff College (correspondence), Air War College (correspondence), and Joint Advanced Warfighting School (residence).